There are multiple layers of security facilities managers can deploy to reduce the risk from building system hacks that have been roiling European grocery store companies, Andrew Ginter, vice president of industrial security at cybersecurity company Waterfall, told Facilities Dive in an interview.
Ginter’s company specializes in the kind of operational technology that facilities managers oversee and that appear to be increasingly vulnerable now that hackers have a template for causing havoc.
“We’ve studied the attacks” to the refrigeration systems, said Ginter, whose division works mostly with large-scale industrial clients and critical infrastructure companies like those managing pipelines.
The European hacks, which forced hundreds of grocery stores to throw out food after their refrigeration systems were forced into defrost mode, show that it doesn’t take a lot to disrupt a critical operation, so facilities managers should work with their IT colleagues to shore up their system defenses, Ginter said.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and other federal agencies earlier this month issued an alert about the hacks and encouraged organizations to strengthen the defenses of their operational technology, which includes the building systems that facilities managers typically oversee. “Owners and operators [are urged] to defend against this activity,” the agencies said.
The steps a facilities manager might take depend on their organization's resources and the defenses it already has in place, Ginter said. It’s not necessary for every organization to take every step, but the more layers a facility deploys, the better protected it will be. “Everyone’s going to stop at a different point in the journey,” he said.
Here’s what Ginter advises:
Update, or upgrade, control software. “This is the easy thing,” he said. “If you have a controller that’s still in support, get the new firmware version and install it.” If updates aren’t available because the system is no longer supported, it’s time to think about replacing the system.
Pull the plug on remote access. Whether or not the control system firmware is updated, it makes sense to defuse the immediate threat by simply disconnecting remote access, said Ginter, noting that for many facilities, this is unlikely to be an option. Operational technology is often configured to require what Ginter called continuous telemetry — the constant transmission of operational data to a central database for purposes that can’t be easily discontinued.
Operators of gas pipelines that have compressor substations, for example, are required to have uninterrupted visibility into the operation of the substations. If they lose that visibility, even for just a short period, they’re required to shut the operation down. “By law, they have 30 seconds to regain control, and if they can’t, they must trigger an emergency shutdown,” he said.
Most facilities aren’t facing a consequence that severe, but pulling the plug on a remote monitoring system can lead to problems that can be just as bad as the hack they’re trying to prevent, Ginter said. “Remote control can be very important and not just a convenience in some kinds of sites,” he said.
Strengthen the firewall. Gitner recommends configuring the network firewall so it can be accessed only from one designated IP address. That means no attempt to access it from any other IP address will be recognized, preventing the system from being seen by hackers.
“If you have a service provider who needs to get in and manage your refrigerators, get their IP address,” he said. “Put it in the firewall so the only thing in the world that can connect to your management system is that vendor’s IP address. If [someone] is poking around to find your system, they will send messages to the IP address and the IP address will send them nothing back. They’ll say, ‘Oh, there’s nothing here,’ and they'll keep going, missing your system.”
Configuring the firewall in that way will make the system more burdensome to access; team members will have to go through the vendor’s site. “It means you can’t log in from your hotel room even though you’re an authorized user, because the hotel has a different IP address,” he said.
Deploying a one-way gateway. Ginter’s company and others offer technology that limits data flows to only one direction — outward, preventing hackers from getting their malicious code into the system. Gateways sit at the interface between the operations network and the internet, or between the operations network and the IT network. “All cyber sabotage is information,” he said. “The only way a control system or a computer can change from a normal state to a sabotaged state is if attack information enters it.” One-way gateways make that difficult, he said.
With limited data flows, one-way gateways can only be used for monitoring; team members can’t access them to change settings. “Let’s say you have a central monitoring station for all of your freezers,” he said. “You put these devices in protected facilities, and they can send stuff out to the internet but it’s not physically possible to send anything back.”
The most consequential kind of infrastructure, like nuclear plants, deploy one-way gateways. “It’s illegal to connect really dangerous systems to the internet through just a firewall,” he said.
The goal of having multiple layers is to raise the cost for hackers to access a system, Ginter said. The harder it is to get in, the more inclined hackers will be to look for softer targets.
“You get attacked when there’s intent and when the enemy’s capabilities exceed your defensive capabilities,” he said. “So, it’s wise to design your defenses around widely available attack capabilities, because the difference between ‘I’m under attack’ and ‘I’m not’ comes down primarily to the intent of the adversary.… lf there’s a vulnerability that any fool can exploit, [I would] fix it, so my defensive capabilities exceed the capability of the adversaries likely to come after me.”